This paper estimates how much of the post-World War II evolution in employment and average wages by gender can be explained by a model where changing labor demand requirements are the driving force. I argue that a large fraction of the original female employment and wage gaps in mid-century, and the subsequent shrinking of both gaps, can be explained by labor reallocation from brawn-intensive to brain-intensive jobs favoring women's comparative advantage in brain over brawn. Thus, aggregate gender-specic employment and wage gap trends resulting from this labor reallocation are simulated in a general equilibrium model. This shift in production is able to explain:
Women 's LFP
Introduction
One of the greatest phenomena of the 20th century has been the rise in female labor force participation. Using evidence from United States data, this study develops a general equilibrium model based on the following two facts of labor supply and wages since World War II:
1. Women's labor force participation, aged 25 to 64, rose from 32 percent in the 1950s to 71 percent in 2005 (see Figure 1 ), while men's labor force participation stayed fairly steady.
2. The gender wage gap, dened as average female to average male wages, changed quickly during the same period. After initially falling from about 64 percent to a low of 59 percent, the gender wage gap began rising again in the mid 1970s reaching around 77 percent by 2005 (see Figure   1 ).
While it is a popular perception that anti-discrimination laws focused on gender equality were the main reasons behind women's changing labor market participation and earnings, economic studies have found various other reasons played an important role in shaping women's labor market experience, such as changes in women's work experience, education, and occupational mix (see, for example, Black and Juhn, 2000; Blau, 1998; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2005) . The forces behind the changing female employment and wages should be of particular interest to economists and policy makers alike.
This paper presents evidence from the United States and develops a general equilibrium model where women's improved labor market experience is driven by labor demand changes. I argue that the main factor in improving women's labor market opportunities, and their potential wages, is the shift in labor shares away from brawn-intensive occupations, as suggested by Galor and Weil (1996) . The shift in labor shares is modeled by a linear exogenous skill-biased technical change, where skilled occupations are those requiring relatively more brain than brawn. This denition deviates from the traditional education-based skill classication. For example, while a department store sales worker is usually classied as unskilled, in this study he/she is part of the skilled labor force since a sales worker requires almost no physical strength in preforming his/her job eectively.
More specically, the model economy consists of two types of occupations, brain-intensive and brawn-intensive. These occupations are aggregated by a CES production function to produce a nal market good. Heterogeneous agents dier in their innate intellectual aptitude (brain), physical ability (brawn) and, therefore, in their willingness to work in either occupation or in the labor market at all. Agents maximize consumption over market and home produced goods by allocating time between the labor market and their home. In addition, nitely lived myopic agents can increase their innate brain abilities by choosing to become educated when young.
A selection bias of women into brain-intensive occupations with initially lower wages (discussed in detail later), a rise in the relative returns to these occupations, and a rise in women's relative labor supply to these occupations since World War II is undisputable (see Figure 2) . Therefore, I argue that female labor force participation rose following skill-biased technical change favoring women's comparative advantage in brain. Following this hypothesis, the wage gap closed for two reasons, (1) a rise in the returns to female-friendly occupations and (2) a faster increase in the female to male eciency-unit labor supply to these occupations. Consequently, the goal of this paper is to estimate the quantitative importance of labor demand changes in explaining the shrinking wage gap and the rise in female labor force participation.
The rise of female labor force participation has been the focus of many recent macroeconomic papers. Some of these studies argue that improvements in home technology, such as the invention and marketization of household appliances (see, for example, Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, 2002, and references therein), or the improvements in baby formulas (see Albanesi and Olivetti, 2006) , enabled women to enter the labor market. While improvements in home technology freed women from time-consuming household chores, theories only focused on home technology improvements do not and cannot eectively address the evolution of the wage gap over time.
Another set of research argues that certain observed labor market changes, such as the closing wage gap (see Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan, 2003) or the increased returns to experience for women (see Olivetti, 2006) , are largely responsible for the rise in female employment. Neither of these studies explain why women suddenly earned higher wages or had higher returns to experience, thus leaving the mechanism behind the closing wage gap unexplained.
To summarize, while previous studies have been successful in explaining part of Fact 1, the rise of the female labor force, they say nothing about the closing gender wage gap beyond taking Fact 2 as given. That is, they only address one aspect of the events shaping women's labor market experience.
Two recent studies focus on the eects of cultural, social, and intergenerational learning on labor supply (see Fernández, 2007; Fogli and Veldkamp, 2007) . As before, these models are successful in explaining part of the rise in female labor force participation. In addition, Fogli and Veldkamp (2007) extend their theory to explain the evolution of wages through women's self-selection bias, i.e., the characteristics of working women changed in the 20th century. However, this model is unable to match the complete wage evolution, only matching either the initial stagnation or the later rise.
All previously mentioned studies focus on labor supply side changes while keeping the labor demand constant. Naturally, this leaves one big unexplored fact: the changing labor demand. Two econometric studies analyze the eects of labor inputs in production on the gender wage gap. Wong (2006) nds that skill-biased technical change had a similar impact on men'and women's wages and, therefore, cannot explain the closing wage gap. Black and Spitz-Oener (2007) quantify the contribution of changes in specic job tasks on the closing wage gap from 1979 to 1999 for West Germany. The authors nd that skill-biased technical change in West Germany, especially through the adoption of computers, can explain about 41 percent of the closing wage gap. While these two studies estimate the eects of relative labor demand changes on the wage gap, both assume an inelastic labor supply. Consequently, they cannot address the non-linear path of average female to male wages stemming from women's self-selection bias into the labor market.
Undoubtedly trends in demand changes are missing from macroeconomic theory focusing on the rise of the female labor force and the shrinking wage gap. I argue that these trends arise from one underlying economic process: technical change leading to labor reallocation from brawn-intensive to brain-intensive occupations. The mechanism developed in this paper is able to explain: (1) While the empirical results are specic to the United States, the model developed could also be used to study cross-country dierences in women's labor market participation. Rogerson (2005) notes that the change in relative employment of women and the aggregate service share (a brainintensive sector given data evidence) between 1985 and 2000 are highly correlated at 0.82, concluding that countries which added the most jobs to the service sector also closed the employment gap the most.
As labor demand changes are the key motivation for this study, Section 2 provides further evidence for the changing labor market, focusing on (1) the evolution of physical and intellectual job requirements in the United States over time, (2) women's self-selection into low-strength jobs due to physical hurdles, and (3) the eects of the changing labor demand for physical and intellectual abilities on female and male wage dierentials. The general equilibrium model is outlined in Section 3, and Section 4 provides analytical results of skill-biased technical change on labor demand, labor supply, and wages. Section 5 discusses the estimation and calibration procedure, and Section 6 presents labor market trends resulting from a linear exogenous skill-biased technical change starting in the 1960s. Lastly, Section 7 discusses extending the model to married households, and Section 8 concludes.
This study's main contribution is in presenting a theory that simultaneously explains Fact 1, the rise in female employment, and Fact 2, the evolution of the gender wage gap, through a rise in female-friendly occupations driven by skill-biased technical change.
United States Labor Facts
To explore the relationship between the rise in female labor force participation and changes in labor demand, this study focuses on the relative demand and supply of two types of labor inputs: intellect and physical strength. This study starts from the premise that women have, on average, less brawn than men. One well documented sector where women are barred from certain occupations because of physical strength requirements is the military. For example, general educational development measures the formal and informal educational attainment required to preform a job eectively by rating reasoning, language and mathematical development. Each reported level is primarily based on curricula taught in the United States, where the highest mathematical level is advanced calculus, and the lowest level only requires basic operations, such as adding and subtracting two-digit numbers. Specic vocational preparation is measured in the number of years a typical employee requires to learn the job tasks essential to perform at an average level. Eleven aptitudes required of a worker (e.g., general intelligence, motor coordination, numerical ability) are rated on a ve point scale, with the rst level being the top ten percent of the population and the fth level compromising the bottom ten percent of the population.
Ten temperaments required of a worker are reported in the 1977 DOT, where the temperament type is reported without any numerical rating. An example of a temperament is the ability to inuence people in their opinions or judgments. Physical requirements include a measure of strength required on the job, rated on a ve point scale from sedentary to very heavy, and the presence or absence of tasks such as climbing, reaching, or kneeling. Lastly, environmental conditions measure occupational exposure (presence or absence) to environmental conditions, such as extreme heat, cold, and noise. I use factor analysis similarly to Ingram and Neumann (2006) to reduce the dimensionality of DOT job characteristics. Using factor analysis, a linear relationship between normally distributed broad skill categories (e.g., brain, brawn, motor coordination) and the 38 DOT characteristics is estimated from the associated 38 variable correlation matrix. For a detailed explanation of the estimation procedure see Appendix A. in brawn requirements might possibly be greater than shown due to intra occupation skill-biased 1 Census and CPS data is obtained from the IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Sobek, Alexander, Fitch, Goeken, Hall, King, and Ronnander, 2004) and the IPUMS-CPS project (King, Ruggles, Alexander, Leicach, and Sobek, 2004) . The 
Wage Decomposition
The pictured brain and brawn trends suggest a strong relationship between the rise of female employment and skill-biased technical change. The combined eect of changes in relative factor prices and factor supplies by gender on the wage gap are computed from the following wage decomposition,
where subscript 0 denotes the base year; w g,T is the average natural logarithmic wage of gender g at time T ; p j is factor j's return; and F j,g is the average supply of factor j by gender g. 2 Average factor demands by gender can be computed from the brain and brawn estimates using United States Census and CPS weights over time. Using standard explanatory variables (e.g., age, education) and an individual's brain, brawn, and motor coordination factor supplies, a log-linear wage regression is estimated to obtain factor returns. The resulting coecients on brain and brawn are taken as a proxy of factor returns (see Appendix B, Table B .1 for coecient estimates). The percentage contribution to movements in the wage gap through changes in relative factor supplies between men and women is captured in the rst term of equation (1). The second term measures the percentage contribution to movements in the wage gap through changes in factor returns. These quantity and price percentages, combined, measure the total percentage contribution to changes in the wage gap resulting from skill-biased technical change between period 0 and period T. Table 1 Changes in brain and brawn over time can explain about one-third of the changes in female to male average wages. As the gender wage gap widened from 1950 to 1980 the total contribution was 2 Allowing factor returns to dier by gender results in slightly higher contributions of relative price and supply changes on the evolution of the gender wage gap.
negative, with 37 percent of the widening wage gap mainly explained by rising returns to brawn.
During this time period a fall in male brawn supply actually prevented the gap from widening further. From 1980 to 2005, the second period under consideration, the wage gap closed considerably.
Relative female to male brain supply growth and falling returns to brawn had approximately equal impacts on the convergence of female to male wages.
Given the above facts, I argue that beginning in the 1950s women entered the labor market and their average wages improved due to the rise of brain-intensive occupations, which complemented women's comparative advantage. The remainder of this paper is devoted to the development of a model consistent with:
1. The rise of a brain-intensive sector;
2. The rise in women's labor force participation;
3. Rising average female wages primarily driven by brain supply and brawn price changes; and
4. An initial wage gap stagnation.
General Equilibrium Model
The simulated economy consists of a unit measure of agents,
Production Process
There are two types of occupations, a brain-intensive production process, b, and a brawn intensive production process, r. Each production process only uses one of the inputs, brain B b ≡ B or brawn R r ≡ R, where B and R are the aggregated individual labor supplies of brain and brawn. These brain and brawn units are combined in a CES production function to produce the nal market good,
where A j is occupation j's factor productivity; φ = 1 1−φ is the elasticity of substitution between the two occupations; and λ j is occupation j's production share, with λ b + λ r = 1. A change in A b Ar over time represents the exogenous skill-biased technical progress.
The relative wage follows from the cost minimization of the nal good,
with w b and w r representing the wages for brain and brawn occupations, respectively. The relative wage is a function of relative factor productivity as well as relative quantities supplied. Using equation (8), and the aggregate production function (7), an occupation's demand of eciency-units per one unit of aggregate good is,
where L j equals either B or R, and the term in brackets is the unit cost of the aggregate production.
Wages and the Distribution of Brain and Brawn
We can now explicitly state an agent's wage, ω k , which is determined by his/her innate brain and brawn ability. From the rm's problem it follows that ω k = max{w b b k , w r r k }. Moreover, brain and brawn are jointly distributed (b k , r k ) ∼ A g (b, r) with diering distributions by gender. Since the premise of this study is the lack of women's brawn, the two gender distributions, A m (b, r) and A f (b, r), only dier in their distribution of brawn, R g . Consequently, the distribution of brain, B, and the correlation of brain and brawn, ρ, are identical for men and women.
Decentralized Equilibrium
An equilibrium, given wages {w b , w r }, exists and is dened by:
1. The demand for market goods, c k , the production of household goods, c h,k , and the supply of labor, g,k , that maximizes household utility; . The dynamics of a steady change in relative technology parameters can be simply deduced by allowing this one time change to occur repeatedly, where A j,t = A j,t−1 (1 + γ j ) with γ j dened as sector technology growth rates for j = {b, r}.
Relative Labor Demand
The relative labor demand follows from the unit labor demands in equation (9),
Taking the derivative of this relative demand with respect to Proposition 1
A rise in relative factor productivity of brain-intensive occupations increases relative labor demand eciency units if φ > 1, implying the two occupations are substitutes in the aggregate production process, since
Representing Proposition 1 graphically (see Figure 6 ), technological change shifts labor demand to the right. Thus, the relative quantity of brain-intensive to brawn-intensive labor eciency units at any given wage ratio increases, and, as a consequence, the equilibrium wage will oset relative demand increases since (φ − 1) < 0.
Labor Supply Decision
At the equilibrium wage rate, a change in relative factor productivity has no eect on the labor supply threshold ω k > A h . Therefore, the relative labor supply does not shift and relative wages rise.
However, a rise in the relative wage will change the type of person who enters the labor market, since the eect on ω k will depend on an agent's innate brain and brawn levels. By normalizing w r = 1, an agent with relatively low brain but high brawn will see no change in his/her labor threshold, while an agent with relatively high brain will experience a rise in ω k and, therefore, might change his/her labor supply decision. An agent works in a brain-intensive occupation if and only if
To illustrate the eects of a rise in relative wages on the labor supply decision by gender, the following section elaborates on the dynamic eects by assuming two independent uniform distributions for brain and brawn. Brain and brawn are independently uniformly distributed with B g ∼ [B, B] and R g ∼ [R g , R g ] for gender g = {m, f }, where R g = R + x g , R g = R + x g , and the only dierence between men and women is the mean brawn level, x m > x f ≥ 0.
The gender-specic labor force participation, LF P g , is dened as,
where a g (b, r) is the joint probability density function. The rst term represents all agents that work in brain occupations, given home productivity and wages. The second term represents all remaining working agents, i.e., agents that work in either occupation. To not trivialize the results, it is assumed that B <
, that is, some agents will not work in brain-intensive and/or brawn-intensive occupations. Given these special distributional assumptions, LF P m > LF P f .
Proposition 2
Women are less likely than men to work in the labor market, since
Proposition 3 As the returns to brain increase, ceteris paribus, the employment gap will shrink, since
and
To summarize, increased demand for low-brawn occupations, coupled with their rising returns, leads to a shrinking gender employment gap given women's comparative advantage in brain.
Wage Gap Evolution
The wage gap is dened as average female to average male wages in terms of average factor supplies to each occupation,
where B g is the average brain level conditional on the working population of gender g in brain
Similarly, R g is the average brawn conditional on the working population of gender g in brawn occupations, π g is the fraction of working agents of gender g working in brain-intensive occupations, and w = w b wr is the relative wage.
There are two opposing eects shaping the evolution of the wage gap, a price eect and a supply eect.
Proposition 4
A rise in the relative wage results in a closing wage gap if
Thus, Proposition 4 holds if a greater fraction of women work in brain-intensive occupations and their average relative brain to brawn eciency-unit labor supply is relatively higher than men's, which I call the price eect. However, this ignores any self-selection bias.
A rise in w b raises wages for agents with relatively high brain to brawn ability levels. Moreover, a rise in w b , ceteris paribus, also enables agents with a comparative advantage in brain, but lower brain ability compared to the working population, to enter the labor market. Consequently, the average brain supply, B g , in the labor market may fall with a rise in relative wages. The fall in average brain supply, however, will be greater for women than men. This second supply eect can be illustrated by returning to the simplied example of the uniform distributions.
The sector specic labor force participation is simply,
The mean brain and brawn levels of gender g equal, 
respectively. Using these identities, the gender wage gap can be written as,
where B g and R g equal the numerator of the conditional expectations, which are the total brain and brawn supplies by gender g.
Given the distributions of brawn, that is, men's higher average brawn levels (x m > x f ), the total brawn supply of men is greater than that of women (R m > R f ) as long as some agents prefer to work in the brawn-intensive sector (w r R g > w b B). Similarly, the total brain supply is greater for women than men as long as some agents prefer to work in the brawn-intensive sector than stay at home (w r R g > A h ). More importantly, a rise in the returns to brain-intensive occupations will have a dierent eect on the average brain supplied by each gender,
Proposition 5
A rise in the relative wage results in a stagnant/widening wage gap when
More specically,
where all terms are positive except for the last term,
, which can be positive or negative. Since LF P f < LF P m and B f > B m from above, this last term, which potentially slows the growth in the conditional mean brain supply, is smaller or negative for women compared to men.
However, as women's and men's total and sectoral-specic labor force participation rates converge over time, this term will take the same value for men and women.
In summary, the price eect will close the wage gap, while the supply eect will widen the wage gap. The supply eect will dominate when women's labor force participation is considerably lower than men's, but will slowly disappear as these labor force participation rates converge. The natural evolution of these eects will initially cause a fall, or stagnation, of average female to male wages, which will close as the price eect begins to dominate.
These analytical results suggest that a model dierentiating between brain-intensive and brawnintensive jobs should replicate the initial United States employment and wage dierences across gender. Moreover, it should reproduce the subsequent evolution of the female labor force participation rate and the gender wage gap, including some initial stagnation in average female wages as observed during the 1960s and 1970s.
Simulation Model Modications
Two model modications are introduced to match relevant United States data targets in the calibration. First, brain-intensive and brawn-intensive occupations utilize both input factors in linear combinations. Therefore, agents' eciency wages are 
An agent chooses to work in a brawn-intensive occupation if and only if
The numerator is the dierence in potential earnings of his/her brain ability between brain and brawn occupations, and the denominator is the dierence in potential earnings between his/her brawn ability in brawn to brain occupations. If this ratio is greater than one, i.e., the additional returns to brain in brain-intensive occupations are greater than the additional returns to brawn in brawn-intensive occupations, the agent chooses to work in a brain occupation.
The second modication extends the model with an education choice allowing agents to increase their innate brain level. This modication enables the model to match the observed trend in brain supply in the United States more precisely (see Figure 4 ). Finitely lived myopic agents can choose to become educated when young at a cost of b η , where η < 0. Education increases an agents brain endowment to B e , such that all educated agents have the same brain level. However, education is cheaper for agents with initially higher levels of brain. Given the myopic nature of agents, agent k who lives N periods chooses to become educated when,
where β is the discount factor. The rst line of equation (28) represents the lifetime utility of being educated, and the second line denes the lifetime utility of being uneducated. Since agents with high brawn, who prefer to work in brawn-intensive occupations, have less to gain from education, equation (28) is less likely to hold. In the context of this study, where men have on average higher brawn levels than women, fewer men will obtain education. As a consequence, average female brain supply, B f , surpasses average male brain supply, B m , once the returns to brain are suciently high to compensate for the cost of education. This is consistent with the United States brain supply trends (see Figure 5) , where women's average brain supply exceeds men's average brain supply by the end of the 1980s. Therefore, in addition to the price eect, the education eect also contributes to the closing gender wage gap once the supply eect subsides.
Calibration
Simulating the model over time requires the calibration of individuals' brain and brawn distributions, and several household and production parameters. Given the pronounced hump-shape in the wage gap between 1940 and 1960, possibly due to the eects of World War II, the model is matched to various 1960 data targets.
Production Parameter Estimation
To determine the production parameters, A b and A r , their growth rates, γ b and γ r , and the substitution parameter, φ, the regression of Katz and Murphy (1992, pg. 69 ) is reestimated, where skilled labor is dened as brain-intensive labor and unskilled labor is dened as brawn-intensive labor. Occupations are sorted by their relative brain to brawn inputs in such a way that occupations with b > r are brain-intensive and occupations with b < r are brawn-intensive (see Figure 3) . Fulltime workers 5 are grouped according to their age group (eight ve-year intervals from 25 to 64 years old), gender, education (less than high school, high school, some college, college), race (white, black, other), marital status (married, single), sector (industry, services), and the type of occupation (brain-intensive, brawn-intensive). I follow Hansen (1993) in estimating labor eciency units at time
where L t,k is the total labor supply of group k and δ k is the group's weight. Weights are determined
the average hourly wage of group k over the average hourly wage of the whole population (across individuals over the entire time period). The resulting relative unit wage of brain over brawn and relative eciency unit labor supply is shown in Figure 2 . This study assumes a log-linear skill-biased technical change over time,
as in Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull, and Violante (1997) . Taking the natural logarithm of the relative wage equation (8), and inserting equation (31), leads to the following regression estimation,
where a 0 = ln λ b λr +φζ 0 , a 1 = φζ 1 , a 2 = φ−1, and
is the relative eciency unit of brain-intensive to brawn-intensive occupations. Table B .2 in Appendix B provides the regression estimates. By normalizing ζ 0 to zero, the parameter values of the annual skill-biased technical change growth rate, γ b − γ r , and the substitution parameter, φ, are obtained (see Table 2 ). 
Additionally, the relative factor productivity,
A b Ar
, is normalized to one in 1960 and λ b is set to match the 1960 labor share of brain-intensive occupations in the economy, which is about 51 percent. 
1960 Model Moments and Calibrated Parameters
Before analyzing the resulting employment and wage trends, Table 3 provides the parameter estimates and specic data targets of the calibration. The model closely matches the brain and brawn standard deviations for both occupations and women. While men's brain and brawn levels are not matched, this calibration still captures the dierences between men and women. That is, women supply considerably less brawn, but similar brain. The model is unable to match the initial female labor force participation, underestimating it by nine percentage points. However, the model is able to generate a large dierence in average female to male wages, where women earn about 66 percent of men's wages (four percentage points higher than in the data). Note that the wage gap is not a data target in the calibration. 
Main Results
The results presented in this section show that the mechanism highlighted in this study does well in matching rising female employment rates in the United States. Moreover, the estimated growth 
Simulated Employment and Wage Gap Trends
This model generates a linear rise in female labor force participation. Table 4 Both the base model and the model without education generate a large linear rise in female labor force participation, explaining about 75 to 79 percent of the total rise observed in the data.
The rise in labor force participation is almost identical across the two models, suggesting that the rise in the returns to brain, rather than the modeled educational choice, is the primary driving force behind women's labor force participation. Men's labor force participation is 100 percent in the The wage gap evolution, however, diers considerably between the two models. In the counterfactual model the supply eect dominates throughout the entire period, resulting in a virtually at wage gap (see Figure 9) . A large fraction of the stagnant wage gap in the counterfactual model is driven by the fact that women's average brain supply does not surpass men's average brain supply. From the 1960s to the 1980s the model with education perfectly parallels the counterfactual model (see Figure 9) , with both models producing virtually stagnant gender wage ratios. The models generate a 0.6 percentage point decrease in average female to male wages during these three decades, compared to a 1.6 percentage point fall in the data. Therefore, about 38 percent of the fall in the United States female to male wage ratio is explained by the models. However, starting around 1980, the base model is able to simulate most of the closing gender wage gap observed in the United Figure 11) . To model dierences in labor force participation between single and married households, the assumption of perfect substitution between market and home production must be relaxed. If households maximize a CES utility function, where market and home goods are gross substitutes, the labor threshold, ω g > T (A h ), will dier across married and single households.
The single household's labor supply decision is identical to Section 3 assuming a discrete labor choice. Therefore, ω g > A h still determines an agent's decision to work or stay at home. A married household, however, now has the following utility function
where the substitution between market and home goods equals ν = 1 1−ν . In a static environment, married household k maximizes this utility function subject to the budget constraint, household production function, and time constraints,
With perfect substitution in home production, households specialize with the higher wage earner, ω 1,k ≥ ω 2,k , entering the labor market rst. In households with equal wage rates the primary worker is assumed to be male, 1 = m. The primary wage earner of household k works in the market if and only if
The secondary wage earner enters the market if and only if the above condition is satised in addition to
That is, the secondary agent's labor supply decision is also dependent on his/her spouse's wage.
The higher a spouse's wage the less likely the secondary worker is to enter the labor market due to imperfect substitution between market and home consumption. Formally, the derivate of the right hand side with respect to ω 1,k is
which is positive as long as A h > 0. This dependence on spousal wages incentivizes married women to stay at home unless their wages are very attractive. However, the general mechanism behind the closing wage and employment gaps will not change. Due to the computational burden of calibrating the married household model, I leave this extension for future research. Moreover, there is little evidence about the appropriate matching function of brain and brawn abilities between spouses, except for some evidence of assortive matching in educational attainment.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to assess the importance of labor demand changes on women's labor force participation and wages. For proper policy development, it is necessary to establish the extent to which the female labor market experience has been shaped by discrimination or other characteristics for over 12,000 occupations (see Section 2 for detail on these characteristics). These characteristics capture the heterogeneity across jobs and workers. While they measure dierent specic job requirements, they can be grouped into broader categories of skills in terms of their common underlying dimensions. This grouping reduces the dimensionality of heterogeneity allowing factor requirements to be matched in a simple general equilibrium model.
Factor analysis uses the correlation matrix of a set of dependent variables to uncover the functional form of some undened independent variables. In the general specication the characteristics, C i , are modeled as linear combinations of the independent variables or factors, f i , plus an error term i ,
where N equals the number of occupations; C i is the vector of characteristics (38 × 1); µ is the vector of characteristic means (38 × 1); Λ is a vector of coecients (38 × n f ) called factor loadings; there is only one waiter/waitress category in the census classication, the DOT contains multiple categories, such as waiter/waitress formal, waiter/waitress, head, waiter/waitress, take out.
Since only information on the characteristics is available, this information is used to estimate both, Λ and
that is, the covariance in the 38 characteristics can be explained by a reduced number of factors,
It is clear that Λ, E FF , and Σ are not separately identiable from this expression. Therefore, factor analysis generally assumes factors to follow a standardized normal distribution, which allows for the identication of Σ. allowing both Λ and Σ, which is diagonal by assumption, to be identied separately. In this specication each characteristic is a function of all factors. In practice, the rst factor estimate will explain the maximum possible covariance between the characteristics. The second factor is estimated to explain the maximum covariance remaining, and so on. A maximum of 38 factors could be estimated, in which case 38 factors are necessary to explain the covariance between all characteristics. In this study three factors explain most of the characteristics' covariance structure (over 93 percent of the total covariance).
9 After preforming initial factor analysis as described above, the rst factor is positively related to intellectual characteristics and negatively correlated with both motor coordination and physical characteristics, making it dicult to interpret the factor consistently. Therefore, I reestimate the factors assuming they are correlated, similarly to Ingram and Neumann (2006) . However, for identication purposes, job characteristics that explain one factor are restricted and cannot explain another factor. For example, mathematical development only explains a job's intellectual requirements directly, while it is only informative on the job's physical requirements through the correlation of the aggregate brain and brawn factor. Table A 
